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information in TCP/IP packets and verify the vulnerability of
these types of covert storage channels against wardens.
Another existing method to transfer secret data is called
Covert Timing Channel (CTC), which manipulates the timing
of overt network packets to achieve a desired pattern [3-5].
This pattern is what is used to convey the covert information.
In [3], the authors introduce a CTC that transfers a covert “1”
by sending a packet during a given time interval and a covert
“0” by not sending a network packet. Another method,
introduced in [4], is known as the Jitter Bug covert channel,
where during a network terminal session the transmitted
keystroke timing is manipulated by applying delays to the
corresponding packets. In another approach [5], the authors
designed a covert timing channel that encodes N covert
symbols to the inter transmission time of L TCP/IP overt
packets.
In addition to these two major categories, papers such as
[6] and [7] introduce covert communication methods that are
a combination of storage and timing techniques. There, a
given network packet is filled with covert data and sent
intentionally late by the covert sender. An overt receiver that
is not aware of the covert channel algorithm will ignore this
packet because it appears to arrive late. However, the covert
receiver gets the late packet and extracts the covert data.
Among all of these CTC algorithms, the one proposed by
Cabuk et al. in [3] is the one that has been used in many
research efforts and investigations of covert communications.
This algorithm is well accepted by the research community
and is used as the basis for numerous other concepts in covert
communication such as detection and modulation. For
example in [8], the authors introduce Cabuk et al.’s CTC
algorithm as a covert communication technique that can be
employed in Building Automation Systems and provide a
solution to prevent covert communication in BAS. The
authors in [9] developed an attack that uses a covert channel
mechanism such as Cabuk et al.’s CTC, to inject a watermark
signature into the network flow via virtual machines in cloud
environments. A network forensics collection system called
Horizon Extender is presented in [10] to avoid information
leakage in HTTP traffic such as the one introduced by Cabuk
et al. In [11] Cabuk et al.’s CTC is one of the case studies for
the general mathematical model that is proposed to predict
the capacity of CTCs in networks.
Although Cabuk et al.’s algorithm is one of the most
influential methods of covert communication, it has some

Abstract –In this paper, we introduce a covert timing channel
(CTC) algorithm and compare it to one of the most prevailing
CTC algorithms, originally proposed by Cabuk et al. CTC is a
form of covert channels – methods that exploit network
activities to transmit secret data over packet-based networks –
by modifying packet timing. This algorithm is a seminal work,
one of the most widely cited CTCs, and the foundation for many
CTC research activities. In order to overcome some of the
disadvantages of this algorithm we introduce a covert timing
channel technique that leverages timeout thresholds. The
proposed algorithm is compared to the original algorithm in
terms of channel capacity, impact on overt traffic, bit error
rates, and latency. Based on our simulation results the proposed
algorithm outperforms the work from Cabuk et al., especially in
terms of its higher covert data transmission rate with lower
latency and fewer bit errors. In our work we also address the
desynchronization problem found in Cabuk et al.’s algorithm in
our simulation results and show that even in the case of the
synchronization-corrected Cabuk et al. algorithm our proposed
method provides better results in terms of capacity and latency.
Keywords-Covert Communication; Covert Timing Channel;
Hidden Information; Capacity; Latency; Network Security

I. INTRODUCTION
Taking advantage of a communication medium, its
characteristics and its resources to send secret information to
specific recipients is known as covert communication. While
it has its origins in ancient times, it found a dramatic
resurgence with the proliferation of the Internet. Several
diverse methods of using exploiting this communication
medium for hidden information exchange purposes are
introduced and investigated in [1-7]. Based on the specific
technique of how this covert communication is accomplished,
it can be classified into three major categories. One of the
simplest and most straightforward methods of covert
communication in networks is to utilize specific header fields
of the overt network packets that are not used for regular
communication and substitute their information with covert
data. This technique is known as Covert Storage Channel
(CSC), and has been studied in articles such as [1] and [2].
The authors in [1] establish a covert channel based on the
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) signaling during the
signaling phase of Voice-over-IP (VoIP). The authors discuss
different parts of the SIP signaling message that can be used
to embed covert data and determine the amount of data that
can be embedded within the generated covert channel. In [2]
the authors discuss the possibility of embedding hidden
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sent after a specific time delay that is known by the covert
sender and receiver. However, for sending a covert “0”,
network packets are transferred normally. On the covert
receiver side, the given interval is monitored to check if any
network packet arrives after this interval or not. If any packet
was received within this interval, it will be interpreted as a
covert “0”, after which the covert receiver resets the
observation interval. If a packet was received after the given
timeout it represents a covert “1”.
Our proposed CTC technique shares the idea of utilizing
timeouts with LACK, proposed in [6] and [7]. In LACK the
contents of the late packet are modified and used as covert
information carrier. In our proposed method, however, which
we call Delayed Packet One Indicator (DPOI) all the covert
information is derived from the timing exclusively, which
significantly reduces detectability of our algorithm. Our
proposed CTC algorithm is shown in Figure 2.
The operation of both Cabuk et al.’s CTC and the
proposed DPOI algorithm is based on the assumption that the
time interval between network packets does not exceed the
covert time interval.
With both of these algorithms introduced we can now
compare them in terms of aspects such as bit error rate,
capacity, latency and more.

flaws such as low covert data rate, high latency, and high bit
error rate due to desynchronization events.
In this paper, we propose a CTC algorithm that solves the
issues of low capacity and high latency for Cabuk et al. and
verifies it by simulation. We will show that we could
successfully reduce the bit error rate during
desynchronization events. However, to prevent these
desynchronization errors we also suggest a solution that
eliminates this problem of Cabuk et al.’s CTC algorithm and
we will show that the Bit Error Rate (BER) is significantly
decreased.
This paper is organized as follows: In section II these
different CTC methods are described in detail. This is
followed by section III in which we provide a comparison and
analysis of these approaches. In section IV, we explain our
simulation parameters and implementation approach.
Simulation results are presented and discussed in section V
followed by the summary and conclusions in section VI.
II. BACKGROUND ON UTILIZIED CTC ALGORITHMS
One of the most influential methods of CTC was
presented by Cabuk et al. in [3]. In this method, covert bits
are sent over the communication channel by considering a
constant time interval, which is known by both the covert
sender and the covert receiver. On the network, an overt
transmitter communicates with an overt receiver. This packet
exchange is intercepted and manipulated by the covert
transmitter on the network path the packets take. Farther
along this path the covert receiver is located. It observes the
packets before they reach the overt receiver. The covert
transmitter manipulates the timing of packets intercepted
from the overt transmitter in order to conform to the specified
time interval. If during that time it allows a packet to be
delivered towards the receiver, this encodes a covert “1”,
whereas if no packet is allowed it is encoding a covert “0”.
Therefore, from the covert receiver’s point of view, the
decoding is based on whether a packet is observed during the
known time interval. This method is illustrated in Figure 1.
Aiming to improve upon the original Cabuk et al., we
introduce our proposed CTC method in which a covert “1” is

III. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
In this section we compare Cabuk et al.’s CTC algorithm
against our proposed DPOI CTC algorithm in terms of their
impact on the overt traffic, capacity for covert data, Bit Error
Rate (BER) of covert data and implementation constraints for
covert sender and receiver.
A. Impact on the overt traffic
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the principles by which the
two CTC algorithms encode covert information has
observably different impact on overt traffic. In Cabuk et al.’s
algorithm, for sending a covert bit zero no packet is allowed
during a given time interval. Therefore, there is a silent period
between overt network packets that are used to transmit the
covert data. This gap results in a decrease in the bandwidth of
the overt network and a corresponding increase in
detectability of this covert activity on the network. However,
for the DPOI algorithm, covert “0” bits are sent normally and
do not have any impact on overt network traffic. For sending
covert “1” bits, both scenarios introduce the same latency to
the overt network traffic. Thus, DPOI has less impact on overt
traffic and lower detectability.
According to this discussion, we define the following
parameters to explain the relationship between the overt
network and covert data in both algorithms:
x
: A given duration of time, which is used as a reference
to determine the number of overt network packets
considered.
: Number of overt network packets within .
x
x
: Number of covert bits (total number of zeros and
ones).
: Number of covert “1” bits within a covert bit string.
x

Figure 1. Cabuk et al.’s CTC algorithm (Modified picture from [3])
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x

B. Covert Channel Capacity
The capacity of a covert channel,
, is defined as the
number of covert bits that can be transferred within a specific
time
from the covert sender to the covert receiver.
Evidently, this capacity depends on the channel latency, noise
and other network factors. However, for the maximum covert
channel capacity analysis we can consider an ideal channel
that does not have the mentioned limitations. Therefore, for
the Cabuk algorithm, the capacity of the covert channel
depends on the covert time interval. This arises from the fact
that each covert bit, regardless of being one or zero, is
transferred within
. Consequently, the capacity of the
covert channel for this algorithm, also reported in [11], is
defined as:

: Covert time interval that is known by the covert
receiver and the covert sender.
: Time duration to transfer one overt packet from a
x
sender to a receiver.
includes channel delay,
operational delay and other existing delays that affect the
overt packet arrival time.
According to these definitions, in Cabuk et al.’s algorithm
the bandwidth of the overt traffic is bounded to the number
of covert “1” bits. This arises from the fact that the overt
network packets are only transmitted if the current covert bit
is one, otherwise no packet is sent over the network.
Therefore the number of overt network packets within a given
time equals to:
×

=

×(

(1)

)

=

In the DPOI CTC, transferring covert bits zero does not
require a silent time interval, which considerably improves
the overt traffic bandwidth. However, the delay after sending
each covert “1” bit results in the reduction of overt traffic
bandwidth within a given time so that:
=

×
(

×

) (

×

)

(3)

For the proposed DPOI CTC algorithm the covert channel
capacity depends on the covert bits being “1” or “0”. In case
of a covert “0” bit, the capacity of the covert channel equals
the number of overt packets that are transferred. However, in
case of covert “1” bits the covert channel capacity is
calculated using equation (3). Hence, the covert channel
capacity depends on the probability of a covert bit being one
or zero. If we assume that the probability of a covert bit being
one is , then the capacity of a covert timing channel for the
second scenario is:

(2)

According to this discussion, sending a given number of
covert “1” bits contributes to the same
in both CTC
algorithms. In addition, the maximum
for Cabuk et al.’s
algorithm is reached when a covert bit string of all ones is
sent. As the number of covert “1” bits increases in the covert
data, the bandwidth of the overt network is improved
proportionally.
In our DPOI algorithm, the maximum overt traffic
bandwidth is achieved by sending a string of zeros covertly.
As the number of ones increases in the covert data,
decreases based on the covert time interval .
In general, the proposed DPOI CTC algorithm is more
suitable to be employed in networks where the latency of
overt traffic and detectability are important factors. Since
Cabuk et al.’s CTC algorithm diminishes the bandwidth of
the overt network traffic, this CTC algorithm can best be
employed in case of low network traffic channels.

= (1 −

)×

+

×

(4)

From this discussion, we can conclude that the capacity
of the DPOI CTC algorithm is larger than the capacity of
Cabuk et al. Furthermore, DPOI’s capacity is bounded to the
number of ones in the covert data. As the number of covert
“1” bits increases the capacity is reduced and approaches
equation (3). Generally we can observe that for the CTC
algorithms discussed in this paper the covert time interval
plays a significant role in the capacity of the covert data. If
the covert interval is not long enough, the network delay jitter
will result in decoding errors in the covert bits, which we will
discuss in the following section in detail.
C. Covert Channel Bit Error Rate
One key target of CTC algorithms, or in fact any
networking approach, is to be able to transmit data with as
few errors as possible. The Bit Error Rate (BER) for both
CTC algorithms depends on various aspects of the network
and implementation of the covert channel algorithms. The
main reasons for getting covert bit errors for the covert timing
channel algorithms are:
1) Network Delay
Although a short covert time interval is desirable for
higher capacity, if it is too short network delay can affect the
decoding result of the covert receiver. Let’s assume that the
covert time interval is 30 ms and the sender transmits a
network packet at the middle of this time interval (covert
“1”). The covert receiver will check the arrival of the network
packet within this 30 ms interval. If the network delay is such
that the receiver observes the packet after its covert time

Figure 2. Proposed CTC algorithm: DPOI
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interval ends, then it will wrongly decode a covert “0” as the
next bit instead of the cover “1” that was intended. Therefore,
the covert time interval should be chosen in such a way as to
diminish and ideally eliminate the network delay effects on
the covert BER.
For Cabuk et al.’s CTC algorithm, network delay
contributes to both zero-to-one and one-to-zero errors.
However, in the proposed DPOI CTC algorithm, network
delay will only cause zero-to-one errors.
2) Network Jitter
The error introduced by network delay jitter is a random
phenomenon that cannot be predicted by the receiver. If the
jitter causes an arbitrary delay that is not expected in the
normal traffic network, then the covert receiver does not
observe the network packet within the expected covert time
interval and produces covert BER. For example, if the
common delay in the network follows normal distribution and
the covert time interval is adjusted between the covert sender
and the covert receiver, then arbitrary jitter can change the
timing of overt traffic, which results in covert data BER.
Similar to network delay, jitter can result in zero-to-one and
one-to-zero errors in Cabuk et al.’s algorithm but only zeroto-one errors in our DPOI CTC algorithm.
3) Desynchronization between the Covert Sender and the
Covert Receiver
Another aspect factor contributing to Covert BER is the
desynchronization of the covert sender and receiver. If the
sender does not compensate for network delay, then the
covert receiver will receive the network packets outside of the
expected covert arrival time interval bounds. Consequently,
the covert receiver will produce decoding errors. In essence,
the covert communication partners become desynchronized if
this delay remains uncompensated for.

In Cabuk et al.’s algorithm, sporadic desynchronization
causes an extra covert time interval to be inserted into the
received covert data. Hence, all following bits are shifted and
thus potentially differ from the expected bits until
synchronization is restored. In our proposed algorithm, if the
covert sender and receiver are not synchronized, then a one
bit zero-to-one or one-to-zero error type can occur. This
arises from the fact that an empty covert time interval from a
covert receiver’s perspective is not an indicator for covert
data. Instead, a late packet indicates a covert “1”. The extra
covert time interval, which results from the
desynchronization problem, can be ignored in the covert
receiver if the desynchronization issue occurs while sending
covert bits “1”. If the desynchronization happens when the
cover bits “0” are sent, one of the normal packets that
indicates covert “0” will arrive late and the covert receiver
will interpret that as a covert “1”. Therefore, a zero-to-one bit
error appears.
4) Network Packet Loss
Although the packet loss in modern Internet
communication links is very low and is assumed to be zero in
[3] and other covert channel publications [4-7], packet loss
can nevertheless cause errors in covert data. For the two CTC
algorithms discussed in this paper packet loss can result in
various error types. In Cabuk et al.’s CTC algorithm, packet
loss will contribute to one-to-zero errors. However, in the
proposed algorithm, it can cause both zero-to-one and one-tozero errors depending on whether the lost packet was
intended to be sent as normal or delayed traffic.

Figure 3. CTC Flowchart of Cabuk et al.’s Algorithm.

Figure 4. CTC Flowchart of the proposed DPOI algorithm

IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND SIMULATION PARAMETERS
We implemented both covert timing channel algorithms
to verify the previous discussions and observe their
differences. These algorithms are implemented using C++,
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using a multithreaded simulation framework where the covert
sender, covert receiver and network channel run on three
separate threads. One of the significant advantages of this
approach is the simultaneous interaction between covert
sender, covert receiver and network channel. Figures 3 and 4
show the overall flowcharts of these two algorithms. The
most important factor that we want to observe from our
simulation results for these two CTC algorithms is the
capacity, latency, and their vulnerability to channel delay.
The simulation parameters and assumptions are collected in
Table 1. In order to represent a wide variety of environments
we have defined different scenarios of covert time interval of
the sender versus the channel delay. The channel latency is
considered as a uniform random distribution in the range of
[45ms, 55ms].

Delay Reduction (%)

Average Percentage of Delay
Reduction for DPOI

Covert Time Interval:
(ms)
Size of Bit Strings
Clock Cycles and Bit Error
Results
Simulation iterations

40
30
20
10
0
250

200

175

150

100

Tct (ms)
Figure 5. Average Percentage of Covert Transfer Delay
Reduction of DPOI compared to Cabuk et al.'s algorithm

Table 1. Simulation Parameters and Assumptions
Parameter
Channel Conditions

50

proposed DPOI algorithm transfers 9.99 bits/sec on average.
However, we can achieve only 5.69 bits/sec using Cabuk et
al.’s algorithm for the same simulation parameters. We
should mention the fact that these results may change slightly
based on operating system, operational speed and other
factors.

Setting and value
Delay channel with uniform
distribution over [45ms,50ms]
250, 200, 175, 150, 100
80 bits from 10 ASCII characters
Averaged over 3 bit stings

B. Reliability
In this section we discuss the results for BER obtained
from our simulation. As discussed before, one of the main
causes of errors in Cabuk et al.’s CTC algorithm is the
desynchronization problem. If the observation covert time
intervals at the transmitter and receiver are not aligned,
packets may not arrive until after the receiver’s current covert
time interval ends, resulting in a covert “0” being decoded
even though originally transmitted was a covert “1”.
Subsequent bits are then affected as well. In our simulations
we assumed correlated clocks between sender and receiver
and thus could achieve interval synchronization by using a
fixed delay to the start of the receiver’s covert timing interval.
We observed that by having a delay of 0.3 ∗
for sending
the first covert bit, we can resolve the desynchronization
problem. However, this approach does not apply to realworld implementations and different synchronization
approaches need to be developed. The results shown in Figure
7 include scenarios for the original Cabuk CTC algorithm (no

All tests were performed 10 times
over three 80-bit strings and the
mean value is presented.

In the next two sections we demonstrate the impact of
these two covert timing channels on the overt traffic and
covert data.
V. COMPARISONS AND EVALUATIONS
A. Capacity and Latency
In Figure 5, the percentage of covert transfer delay
reduction we achieved with our DPOI algorithm compared to
Cabuk et al.’s algorithm is shown. This result is obtained
from transmitting the test’s 80 covert bits to the covert
receiver based on different covert time intervals
. As we
can see in this figure, our proposed DPOI algorithm improves
the covert message transfer time by more than 40% on
average for all the time intervals. We can observe that our
proposed DPOI algorithm significantly outperforms Cabuk et
al.’s and can transfer bit strings almost twice as fast. As
discussed before, the duration that it takes to transfer 80
covert bits for the proposed DPOI algorithms depends on the
number of covert “1” bits.
Figure 6 shows the average capacity for all the values of
covert time intervals and is based on the mentioned
assumptions for the channel delay. The simulations are
conducted 10 times for 3 strings of 80 covert bits and the
average capacity is calculated. From this figure we can
observe that the covert data capacity is considerably
improved in the proposed DPOI algorithm and our proposed
algorithm can transfer approximately twice the amount of
covert data compared to Cabuk et al.’s algorithm. For
example, in the case of 175ms covert time interval our

Covert Data Capacity (bits/sec)

Covert Data Capacity
20
15
10
5
0
250

200

175

Tct (ms)
Cabuk et al. [3]

150

100

Proposed DPOI

Figure 6. Covert Data Capacity of CTC Algorithms: Cabuk
[3] vs. DPOI
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Bit Error Rate

60

In this paper we introduced a new CTC algorithm called
DPOI that transmits covert “0” bits by transmitting overt
network packets without delay while covert “1” bits are
delivered by delaying the overt packet for a specific time. We
have shown that the proposed algorithm performs better than
Cabuk et al. [3]. Cabuk’s work is among the most cited CTC
algorithms used in the literature and in ongoing research
efforts. We have analyzed, compared and evaluated the two
CTC algorithms to extract insights on covert data rate,
latency, types and causes of bit error, and the Bit Error Rate
itself. Based on the simulation results and our analysis for
these two algorithms, our proposed algorithm can transmit
more covert data within a specific amount of time compared
to Cabuk et al. Also, one of the significant problems with
Cabuk’s algorithm is the desynchronization of the covert
sender and receiver that causes erroneous bit insertions in the
decoded data and subsequent bit error sequences. Even
though we provided a modification to Cabuk et al. that
addresses this desynchronization problem, our proposed
DPOI CTC algorithm performs better in terms of covert data
rate and latency.

BER (%)

50
40
30
20
10
0
250

200

175

150

100

Tct (ms)
Cabuk et al., No Sync
Proposed DPOI

Cabuk et al., Sync

Figure 7. Bit Error Rate for the Covert Timing Algorithms

sync), a modification that resolves the desynchronization
problem (sync), as well as our proposed DPOI algorithm.
In [3] the authors have tested their CTC algorithm using
a test bed implementation. However, the details and different
parameters of their test bed are not stated in their paper. The
desynchronization problem is addressed by string to string
correction after receiving the covert bits and the character
accuracy is calculated for different covert time intervals (20,
30, 40, 50, 60, and 80 ms) in a normal traffic channel with an
average round trip time of 31 ms.
From Figure 7 we can also observe that in cases where the
covert sender interval time is more than 4 times the delay of
the channel ( : 200 250 .
: [45 − 55]), only few
bit errors are observed and the covert data accuracy remains
above 90%. However, as
decreases the number of bit
errors increases, for the reasons explained in section III part
C, especially the desynchronization problem. When we
corrected the Cabuk’s desynchronization issue in our
simulations, then more accurate results can be obtained for
Cabuk’s algorithm. While our proposed DPOI algorithm
shows a higher BER than the Cabuk’s corrected version, it
also achieved almost twice the capacity of Cabuk et al.’s
algorithm and unlike the modified version of Cabuk can be
used in real environments as well.
Our results show that the proposed DPOI CTC algorithm
outperforms Cabuk et al., especially when considering
capacity and covert bit accuracy for scenarios of
≥ 200.
Our algorithm transfers strings of 80 covert bits within
= 200, while providing
approximately 9094.33 ms for
more than 97% covert data accuracy. Although Cabuk et al.’s
CTC shows promising results when the synchronization
problem is addressed, the amount of time it takes to transmit
covert data is significantly longer. Cabuk’s algorithm
contributes to transmission delay for all the transferred
packets over the network link, which increases detectability
and is not desirable in network applications. Furthermore,
while we addressed the desynchronization problem of Cabuk
et al. in our simulation, this approach is not feasible for actual
implementations and a more suitable approach is needed.
Hence, Cabuk’s algorithm is more vulnerable to
desynchronization between sender and receiver. By contrast,
our proposed DPOI algorithm does not share this limitation.
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